We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price.
Introduction
The management of land and natural resources is one of the most critical challenges facing developing countries (Kaye and Yahya, 2012; van der Ploeg and Rohner, 2012) . In particular, natural resource exploitation is an industrial activity that has recently been generating conflicts between firms and indigenous communities in many countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
Examples include Mexico (Tetreault, 2015) , Peru (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Fraser, 2018) , Sierra Leone (Akiwumi, 2014) , India (Sarkar, 2015 (Sarkar, , 2017 , Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2018) and Indonesia (Welker, 2009) . Another examples appear in Sosa (2011) and Walter and Urkidi (2015) . Another two examples, both in Colombia, arise from a restitution problem where two agents have rights over the land (Jaramillo et al., 2014) and from land aggregating for housing and infrastructure (Kominers and Weyl, 2012) , respectively.
In these land conflicts, there exist rights over the land for each side. For the case of mining activities, Article 10 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People defined Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) as the principle that indigenous communities have the right to give or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the land they customarily own, occupy or otherwise use (UN, 2007) . On the other hand, the mining firm has an investment and a concession over those lands, or, even if a concession has not been granted yet, the firm may have a profit opportunity high enough to make it possible to compensate the land owners in a fair way (Helwege, 2015) . In order to solve these land conflicts, it is fundamental for the planner (e.g. the government) to have all the relevant information about both sides.
In many situations, land identification and demarcation may be not clear, as in the case of customary land (Gildenhuys, 2005; Azima et al., 2015) . This situation can lead to manipulation by merging or splitting of the communities, due to the fact that they may have incentives to strategically misrepresent their identity in order to influence the final outcome to their own advantage. The study of this kind of manipulation is common in the strategy-proofness literature in the context of cost sharing (Moulin and Shenker, 2001; Sprumont, 2005; Gómez-Rúa and Vidal-Puga, 2011; Ju, 2013; Massó et al., 2015) , resource allocation (Erlanson and Flores-Szwagrzak, 2015) , job scheduling (Moulin, 2007 (Moulin, , 2008 , indivisible object allocation (Sun and Yang, 2003; Svensson, 2009; Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015) , assigning problems (Kojima and Manea, 2010) , and taxation problems (Ju and Moreno-Ternero, 2011 ), among others. Splitting and merging proofness have also been deeply studied in bankruptcy problems where an estate E > 0 should be divided among a set of claimants N with claims given by c ∈ R N . Several authors (O'Neill, 1982; Moulin, 1987; Chun, 1988; de Frutos, 1999; Ju, 2003; MorenoTernero, 2006 MorenoTernero, , 2007 Ju et al., 2007) have showed that merging and splitting proofness in bankruptcy problems leads to a proportional share of the estate.
See for example Thomson (2003 Thomson ( , 2015a .
In this article, we assume that the government or planner seeks to assign a price and amount of land fairly and efficiently, and at the same time, to guarantee non-manipulability by reassignment-proofness. In particular, our work can be seen as part of the theory of mechanism design applied to land rental (see Sen (2007) for an overview and Sarkar (2017) for a more recent contribution). We assume there is a single tenant who can be a mining firm, and several lessors who can be a group of communities. Each community has some available amount of land c i with a reservation price r per unit, that for simplicity we consider equal for all of them. The mining firm needs to rent an optimal amount of adjacent land E, which is a completely divisible object 1 .
A rule determines, for each land rental problem, a quantity of adjacent land to be rented by each community and a price that the mining firm must pay as a way of compensation.
In order to study rules that guarantee non-manipulability, we propose a version of strategy-proofness such that communities should not find it profitable to re-assign the land among them. For instance, asumme we have two lessors, and the first of them may decide to act as two lessors by spliting her land. A rule which considers a fix price per unit of land and an equalitarian land share will not satisfy reassigment-proofness, because the first lessor finds it profitable to split her land.
Also, we propose a version of land monotonicity that assures fairness, in the sense that an increase in the quantity of available land affects positively the final profits to both sides.
Our first result is a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy these properties. A rule belongs to this family of rules if the price does not depend on the available land and each amount of rented land is
proportional. By adding a property inspired by "standard for two-person"
in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) , we characterize a parametric subfamily. A rule belongs to this parametric subfamily of rules if, aditionally, the price depends on a parameter. Another property is consistency, that states that the rule should behave in a similar way independently of the number of agents involved. This is a classical property in cooperative games (see van den Brink et al. (2013) and Huettner (2015) for two recent applications), and it has also been studied in bankruptcy problems (see Thomson (2008 Thomson ( , 2015b and references herein) and cost sharing problems (see for example Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2007) and Koster (2012) ). By adding consistency and continuity we characterize another parametric subfamily of rules. The intersection of both parametric subfamilies singles out two particular rules: one of them optimal for the tenant, where the price coincides with to the tenant's reservation price, and the other optimal for the lessors, where the price coincides with the maximun feasible value.
We organize the paper as follows: In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we study and characterize the family of rules that satisfy land reassignment-proofness and land monotonicity. In Section 4, we characterize the family of rules that also satisfy a weighted version of "standard for twoperson". Finally, in Section 5, we characterize the subfamily of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness, land monotonicity, consistency and continu-ity.
The model
Let N + = {1, 2, . . . } be the set of potential lessors. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be an arbitrary set of lessors, and let S be an arbitrary subset of N . Given y ∈ R S , we write y(S) = i∈S y i . Given x, y ∈ R S , we write x ≤ y when x i ≤ y i for all i ∈ S. Moreover 0 S denotes the vector (0, . . . , 0) ∈ R S . We denote the set of nonnegative real numbers as R + , and the set of positive real numbers as R ++ . We denote the set of rational numbers as Q.
Let V N = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N } be the set of all unordered pairs {i, j} over
We say that G is a connected network when, for all i, j ∈ N , there exists a sequence of different edges {{i s−1 , i s }} e s=1 that satisfy {i s−1 , i s } ∈ G for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , e}, i = i 0 and j = i e . We denote the set of all connected networks over N as G N . Given G ∈ G N and S ⊂ N , we denote the restriction
A land rental problem is a tuple (N 0 , µ, c, r, G) where N 0 = {0} ∪ N is the set of agents with 0 the unique tenant and N the set of lessors, µ :
R + → R is a function that assign to each amount of adjacent land the tenant's revenue when that amount is rented, c ∈ R N ++ is the vector whose coordinates represent the amount of available land for each lessor, r ∈ R + is the reservation price per unit of land for lessors, G ∈ G N identifies the lessors whose land is adjacent. Hence, the aggregate welfare when the tenant rents l units of adjacent land is µ(l) + (c(N ) − l)r. We normalise µ(0) = 0, and assume that G is a connected network and that there exists a unique
We then denote K = µ(E) as the optimal welfare that the agents can obtain.
This implies that K > rE, i.e. there exists benefit of cooperation.
Under these conditions, an efficient allocation implies that the amount of rented adjacent land is E and the welfare of the tenant is K. Thus, the only relevant parameters of µ are E and K. Furthermore, for convenience we use N instead of N 0 . Henceforth, we would be interested in the "efficient land rental problem", denoted by (N, K, E, c, r, G). Let L be the set of all land rental problems.
A feasible agreement is a pair (x, p) ∈ R N + × R + satisfying x ≤ c and {i ∈ N : x i > 0} a connected component in G, where x i is the land rented by lessor i ∈ N , and p is the price per unit of land. The set of feasible
be the set of all potential feasible agreements.
Given (x, p) ∈ A L , the utility for tenant and each lessor i ∈ N are
We define a rule as a function ψ : L −→ A that assigns to each prob-
satisfying:
(ii) for all α, β > 0, p(N, αK, βE, βc, 
The first condition (efficiency) says that the amount of land rented is optimal. The second condition (scale invariance) says that the final price and the amount of land rented are independent of changes of scale. The third condition (individual rationality) says that the lessors get at least zero (this is implied by r ≤ p), and under efficiency, the tenant also gets at least zero (this is implied by p ≤
K E
). Under efficiency, the utility of the tenant can be
There exist two special classes of rules: On the one hand, a rule is tenantoptimal when the price is given by p = r. In that case, x i is irrelevant for each i ∈ N , because their payoffs are zero, and so the final payoff allocation is unique. On the other hand, a rule is lessors-optimal when the price is given
. In the latter case, there are many possible payoff allocations when E < c(N ), all of them giving zero to the tenant.
Land reassignment and monotonicity
Since there may be no official registration and demarcation of the customary land, the lessors can reach an agreement of reallocating it in order to share extra benefits so created under a rule. 
In this case, we say that G and G are S-compatible.
For the planner it is not possible to see this customary land situation, and it may be hard to get the outcome that the rule is supposed to attain.
In our context manipulation implies that the lessors will benefit by merging or splitting under reallocating their land. Our aim is to fully identify rules that are free from this concern. We formalise this property as follows.
, and
If the right-hand side of expression is larger than the left-hand side and the problem is (N, K, E, c, r, G), then lessors in N \S can gain by reallocating their land so that the problem becomes (N , K, E, c , r, G ). Analogously, if the left-hand side of expression is larger than the right-hand side and the problem is (N , K, E, c , r, G ), then lessors in N \ S can gain by reallocating their land so that the problem becomes (N, K, E, c, r, G). S is the set of lessors that remain unchanged (S = ∅ is also possible). This property prevents lessors from having incentives for merging or splitting by reallocating their land.
The following property says that an increase of the available land, leaving
K and E unaffected, is (weakly) beneficial for everyone involved.
Under this property, the tenant will be weakly better off when there are more available land. Furthermore, when only one lessor has more available land and the rest of lessors remain unchanged, this lessor will be weakly better off.
Let F be the set of functions f :
. Now, we consider the family of rules defined by p
for all i ∈ N . So, we obtain different rules with different functions f ∈ F. These functions determine the price, whereas the amount of land is always divided proportionally, in line with the known results on invariance under reassignment in cost and surplus sharing (cf. and, when p = r, the assigned amount of land is given by
Figure 1: Examples of functions in F that determine six different rules, including an optimal rule for the tenant (a) and an optimal rule for the lessors (b).
for some f ∈ F and,
for all i ∈ N . We will prove that ψ satisfies RP and LM. In order to prove that ψ satisfies RP, let
. Analogously, on the other hand, we have i∈N
. Since c(N \ S) = c (N \ S) and c i = c i for all i ∈ S, we have that c(S) = c (S) and c(N ) = c (N ). Hence the last two expressions coincide. We now prove that ψ
hence condition (i) holds. If c i ≤ c i and c(N \ {i}) > 0, and c j = c j for all
) for all i ∈ N , hence condition (ii) also holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies RP and LM. For simplicity, we write
and so on. We proceed by series of claims.
Claim 3.1 If K = E = 1 and N = {1}, then the price p does not depend on c.
Analogously, c 1 ≤ c 1 implies u 1 ≤ u 1 and p ≤ p (the higher c 1 , the lower p).
Proof. Assume first 1 / ∈ N . By RP, u(N ) = u 1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (c(N )), r, ∅)).
Under Claim 3.1 and efficiency, this is equal to p({1}, 1, 1, (1), r, ∅) − r, hence
Therefore, we have p = f (r). Assume now 1 ∈ N . Let i ∈ N + \N . Under RP, u i (ψ({i}, 1, 1, (c(N )), r, ∅)) = u 1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (c(N )), r, ∅)) and we proceed as before.
, G , and under Claim 3.2 we have that
Therefore, the price is determined by Claim 3.3. Now we focus on the amount of land x.
Claim 3.4 If p = r and there exist i, j ∈ N such that c i = c j , then 
. Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write
On the one hand, by efficiency, x i +x j = E and x * i (N * i \{j})+x * i
On the other hand, by efficiency,
We have (N * ij , K, E, c * ij , r, G * ij ) with N * ij ∩ N = ∅ and c * ij (N * ij ) = c(N ).
By RP, u * ij (N * ij ) = u(N ). By p = r and Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write x * ij (N * ij ) = x(N ). Under Claim 3.4 and efficiency, we obtain that
for all k ∈ N * ij . By efficiency and x j = x * ij (N j ), we have that x i = E − x * ij (N j ). Under Claim 3.4, this is equivalent to write 
Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p − r)
which is equivalent to write
be an increasing sequence of positive rational numbers that converges to c i and
We can find such a sequence because c i > 0 and c i + c j > E. Under Claim 3.5, we have
, which is equivalent to write
Hence, 
Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p − r)x j ≤ (p − r)x s j . Since p = r, this is equivalent to
be an increasing sequence of rational numbers that converges to c j and such
We can find such a sequence because c i > 0 and c i + c j > E. Under Claim 3.6, we have
, we deduce
, and G ij = {{i, j}}. By efficiency,
. By RP and p = r, we have x(N \ {i}) = x ij j , so that
Therefore, the amount of land is determined by Claim 3.8.
We denote ψ f as the rule corresponding to f ∈ F that is given by p
for all i ∈ N .
Weighted standard for two-person
We study a property that is inspired on the so called standard for two-person property by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . This property follows a "divide the surplus equally" idea for two-person situations. In our context, the twoperson case arises when |N | = 1, i.e. the only agents are the tenant and a single lessor. Standard for two-person says that both the tenant and the lessor obtain equal benefit. We formalize this property as follows. Let L 2 be the set of land rental problems with a unique lessor.
Next theorem characterizes the unique rule that satisfies RP, LM and S2.
The function that determines this rule is represented in Figure 1 (e). It is straightforward to check that ψ = ψ f with f (t) = 1+t 2 for all t and
. By Theorem 3.1, ψ satisfies RP and LM. So, we just need to prove that u 0 (ψ({1}, K, E, c, r, ∅)) = u 1 (ψ({1}, K, E, c, r, ∅)). The left side of the equality is equal to K −
. Analogously, the right side of the equality is equal to
− r x 1 . By efficiency, x 1 = E, and hence
. Therefore, the equality holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies RP, LM and S2. By Theorem 3.1
for all i ∈ N . We need to prove that
or equivalently
. This is equivalent to 1 − f (t)x 1 = (f (t) − t)x 1 . By efficiency, x 1 = 1, which is equivalent to write 1 − f (t) = f (t) − t. Hence,
. Finally, since K > rE and c 1 = c(N ), we deduce p = r so
Next, we generalize the standard for two-person concept in a nonsymmetric way. Notice that S2 determines the final payoffs for two-person problems, forcing both the tenant and the unique lessor to receive the same value. Since tenant and lessor are not symmetric, we can reasonably allow one side of the market to extract a higher value than the other. In our context, since the rules satisfy efficiency, it is enough to fix the relative payoff between both agents. In particular, a rule satisfies the next property when the payoffs are in the same proportion for every single-lessor problem.
Weighted Standard for 2-person (WS2) There exists ω ∈ [0, 1] such
Next theorem characterizes the parametric subfamily of rules that satisfy RP, LM and WS2. We can see three examples of functions that determine these rules in Figure 1 (a), (b) and (e), respectively. and, when ω < 1, the quantity of land is given by
for all i ∈ N . By Theorem 3.1, ψ satisfies RP and LM for
. The left side of the equality
the right side of the equality is equal to ω(
x 1 = E, and hence the right hand side of the equality is ω(1 − ω)(K − rE).
Therefore, equality holds. and, when p = r,
for all i ∈ N . This implies x(N ) = E. It is clear that ω < 1 implies p = r. To see why, notice that p = r implies u 1 = 0, whereas u 0 + u 1 = K − rE > 0, so u 0 > 0, and by WS2, (1 − ω)u 0 = ωu 1 = 0, so (1 − ω)u 0 = 0, which implies ω = 1. We still need to prove that
Notice that, when ω = 1, we obtain an optimal rule for the tenant, and when ω = 0, we obtain an optimal rule for the lessors. Given ω ∈ [0, 1], we denote ψ ω as the rule corresponding to the function ψ f with f (t) = 1−(1−t)ω for all t and
for all i ∈ N . In particular, ψ 1 2 is the rule given in Theorem 4.1.
Consistency
Consistency is a well-known principle. Consistency For all (N, K, E, c, r, G) ∈ L and S ⊂ N such that G S is a connected network and x(S) < E, a rule ψ is consistent if
Next proposition characterizes the second parametric subfamily of rules that satisfy RP, LM and consistency. We can see some examples of functions that determine these rules in Figure 1 b) The amount of land when p = r is given by
Proof. (⇐) Let α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β so that the price and the amount of land are given by a) and b), respectively. Let f ∈ F defined as follows: . Therefore,
Case 3: r > 0, rE < αK and p = β α r. Under a.2), we know that p = β α r when r > 0 and rE < αK . Since r > 0, it is enough to check that rE < αK . Equivalently, r (E − x(S)) < α K − β α rx(S) . Since rE < αK, it is enough to check that rx(S) ≥ βrx(S). This is trivially true when rx(S) = 0. Otherwise, it is equivalent to check that β ≤ 1, which is true by definition.
Case 4: r > 0, rE = αK and p = β α r. In this case, p =
and β ≤ 1, we have that
. We have two sub-cases: First, if rE < αK , then it holds by a.2) and the fact that p
. Since E − x(S) > 0, this is equivalent to rE > αK, which is true in this case.
We check now that u i (ψ(L )) = u i (ψ(L)) for all i ∈ N 0 \ S. Assume first i ∈ N \ S. We need to prove that (p − r)x i = (p − r)x i . This is trivially true when p = r. Hence, assume p = r. We need to prove x i = x i . Since
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies RP, LM and consistency. Under RP and LM, by Theorem 3.1 there exists f ∈ F such that p = K E f rE K and,
Denote L = (N, K, E, c, r, G) and let S ⊂ N with E > x(S) and L = (N , K , E , c , r, G ) be defined as in the definition of consistency. Hence,
Assume α > 0. Then we can fix r ∈]0, 1[ such that f (r) < 1. Hence,
for all t ∈]0, r]. We will prove that f (t) = θt for all t ∈]0, α[,
. For all t ∈]0, α[, there exists r > t such that f (r ) < 1 and
. If t < r, we can take r = r, thus Then, the second line of (1) is satisfied.
From Case I and Case II we can deduce f (α) ∈ {β, 1}. This is the third line of (1).
Given α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β, we define ψ α,β as the rule corresponding to the function given in Proposition 5.1 with f (0) = 0, f (α) = β and such that the amount of land is given by
Next property says that small changes in the land rental problem should not cause large changes in the chosen allocation.
Continuity The price p and the amount of land x are continuous functions on L.
The rules that satisfy RP, LM, consistency and continuity constitute a particular subfamily of rules from the one determined in Proposition 5.1
and it is characterized in the next theorem. We can see some examples of functions that determine these rules in Figure 1 By adding continuity, we will prove that p = 
